匹兹堡学派——黑格尔在分析哲学中得到了怎样的复兴？/ 翻译

[1]  A caveat: Hegel himself was very interested and well informed about the sciences of his day. His followers, particularly those ensconced in academia, not so much.

提示：黑格尔本人熟稔他时代的科学发展，而他的学术同僚们却不尽然。

[ 2 ]  Wilfrid Sellars, 「Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man」 [PSIM]  ¶44, in Science, Perception and Reality [SPR] : 16; in In the Space of Reasons: Selected Essays of Wilfrid Sellars, eds. Kevin Scharp and Robert B. Brandom [ISR] : 384. Available online at http:// www.ditext.com/sellars/psim.html.

[ 3 ]  Sellars, PSIM ¶44.

[ 4 ]  Sellars, PSIM ¶48, in SPR: 17; in ISR: 385.

[ 5 ]  The ‘manifest image’ is the more-or-less refined ‘common-sense’ conceptual frame work in terms of which humans have come to understand and cope with themselves in their world. It is a Strawsonian/Aristotelian framework in which persons and things are the basic objects. In Sellars’s view, it is currently being challenged by the growth of a new and categorially distinct framework that is being developed by the empirical sciences, the 「scientific image of humanity in the world.」 「显白形象」近似等同人们更加精密的常识概念结构。人们通过这些结构在世界中理解和应对自身。在斯特劳森/亚里士多德式的框架中，人和事物是最基本的物体，而在塞拉斯的视角中，这一框架正为当下日益发展的经验科学所挑战。这一经验科学框架新颖且范畴独特，被称为「人类在世界中的科学形象」。

[ 6 ]  Sellars uses ‘picture’ here in a technical sense that is not equivalent to proposition or statement. Mentalistic expressions, Sellars is telling us, do not participate in the basic, naturalistically unproblematic, pre-semantic picturing relations that hold between objects in the world and the occurrence of particular sign-design types. Mentalistic expressions relate to real-world objects and events in much more complex ways.

塞拉斯此处的「图景」的含义并非等同于命题或声明。塞拉斯告诉我们，心灵表达不参与到世界中的物体和具体符号设计模式的出现[ the occurrence of particular sign-design types ] 这二者的基本的、自然意义上不冲突的、前语义的的图景关联。心智表达以复杂得多的方式与真实世界中的物体和事件关联。

[ 7 ]  Wilfrid Sellars, Science and Metaphysics, chap. 5, ¶78: 142–143.

[ 8 ]  A full interpretation of this passage would require an explication of Sellars’s obscure notion of picturing, which he thinks is a key to realism. But that goes beyond the scope of this chapter. See W. A. deVries, 「Getting Beyond Idealisms.」 

[ 9 ]  Wilfrid Sellars, 「Autobiographical Reflections: [ February, 1973 ] ,」 285. Available online at http://www.ditext.com/sellars/ar.html.

[ 10 ]  It is also worth noting that Sellars would not think that rational connections among concepts are always analytic or a priori. Sellars makes room for material connections that are nonetheless rational. In general, Sellars thinks of rational connections, not on the containment model that Kant employed, but as inference tickets, and then recognizes both formally and materially valid inferences.

It is also worth remarking here that Sellars’s phrase ‘the intelligible order’ implies a unique referent. But if the intelligible order is the set of rational connections among concepts, then there will be, of course, many possible intelligible orders, since there are multiple possible conceptual frameworks. Sellars does seem to assume that we can sensibly posit a Peircean ideal framework that, given world enough and time, we would be fated to accept.

值得注意的是，塞拉斯不认为概念间的理性连接总是分析或先验的，而给尽管是质料但依旧是理性的连接保留了空间。总体而言，塞拉斯认为理性连接不是康德的「包含」模型，而是推论的凭证，并辨别了形式和质料上的有效推论。同时应当注意到，塞拉斯的「可理解的秩序」特有所指。但既然可理解的秩序是概念间的理性连接的集合，那么既然有很多可能的概念框架，就应当有很多可能的可理解秩序。塞拉斯似乎确实认为我们可以假设一个皮尔斯式的观念框架，只要有足够的时间，我们注定会接受这一框架。

[ 11 ]  Sellars, PSIM ¶44, in SPR: 16; in ISR: 384.

[ 12 ]  I have argued that preservation of the 「language of individual and community intentions」 in the scientific image [ as opposed to mere ‘joining’ ]  is the proper conception in several places; see deVries, 「Ontology and the Completeness of Sellars’s Two Images,」 and 「Images, Descriptions, and Pictures: Personhood and the Clash.」 

我在多处论证过，在科学形象[而非单纯的「参与」 ] 中保留「个体语言和群体意向」是合适的理解；请参考deVries, 「Ontology and the Completeness of Sellars’s Two Images,」 and 「Images, Descriptions, and Pictures: Personhood and the Clash.」 

[ 13 ]  Wilfrid Sellars, EPM. This passage, often called the ‘scientia mensura’, occurs in §41; in SPR: 173; in KMG: 253. Also available online at http://www.ditext.com/sellars/ epm.html.

[ 14 ]  Sellars, PSIM ¶49; in SPR: 17; in ISR: 385.

[ 15 ]  I take it, e.g., that plants are categorially different from animals in the manifest image.

我认为，植物和动物有范畴上完全不同的显白形象。

[ 16 ]  Ruth Millikan, Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories. Millikan is a right-wing Sellarsian who would agree with Sellars that we need to turn to natural science for the ultimate story about language, thought, and other biological categories. For an interesting review of her differences with the left-wing Brandom, see Ruth Millikan, 「The Father, the Son, and the Daughter.」 For further discussion of their differences, see Willem A. deVries, 「All in the Family.」 

Ruth Millikan, Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories. 米利肯是右翼塞拉斯主义者，和塞拉斯一样认为我们需要在自然科学中寻找语言，思想和生物类别的真理。米利肯写过一篇有趣的文章，回复了她和左翼塞拉斯主义者布兰顿之间的差异。请参考「The Father, the Son, and the Daughter.」 For further discussion of their differences, see Willem A. deVries, 「All in the Family.」 

[ 17 ]  Sellars, EPM §36, in SPR: 169; in KMG: 248.

[ 18 ]  Formally valid inferences are so in virtue of the syntactic structures of the sentences involved, without regard to their content. Modus ponens or a valid syllogism are classic examples. Materially good inferences are not formally valid, but are such that it is part of the language that the truth of the premise[ s ]  entails the truth of the conclusion. For ex ample, 「A is red」 materially implies 「A is colored.」 Sellars thinks of scientific laws as pro posed and corroborated material inference tickets.

形式有效的推断之所以有效靠的是所涉及语句的语法结构，而非内容。肯定前件式和有效三段论是经典例子。质料上好的推断并不形式有效，但内置于这样一种结构，即前提为真则结论为真。比如说，「A是红的」质料上暗示了「A有颜色」。塞拉斯认为科学法则就是被提出和确证过的质料推论的凭证。

[ 19 ]  Sellars, EPM §38: in SPR: 170; in KMG: 250.

[ 20 ]  John McDowell, Mind and World, 23.[ 21 ]  Sellars, 「Autobiographical Reflections,」 285.

[ 22 ]  For an intelligible, thorough examination of Sellars’s two-component analysis of per ceptual experience, see Paul Coates, The Metaphysics of Perception: Wilfrid Sellars, Per ceptual Consciousness and Critical Realism.

如果想对塞拉斯的对感知经验的双组成分析有一个更明晰透彻的检验，请参考Paul Coates, The Metaphysics of Perception: Wilfrid Sellars, Perceptual Consciousness and Critical Realism

[ 23 ]  John McDowell, Mind and World, 51.

[ 24 ]  McDowell, Mind and World, 26.

[ 25 ]  It is notable that attacking the absoluteness of familiar philosophical distinctions is a standard move for pragmatists. This connection to pragmatism is particularly important for Brandom.

值得注意的是，攻击熟悉的哲学上的差异性是典型的实用主义做法，而这一与实用主义的联系对布兰顿至关重要。

[ 26 ]  This is probably the influence of Donald Davidson on McDowell.

这很有可能是唐纳德·戴维森[Donald Davidson] 对麦克道威尔的影响。

[ 27 ]  Sally Sedgewick’s analysis in Hegel’s Critique of Kant: From Dichotomy to Identity is very helpful.

Sally Sedgewick在此处的分析是很有帮助的：Hegel’s Critique of Kant: From Dichotomy to Identity

[ 28 ]  See Paul Redding, Analytic Philosophy and the Return of Hegelian Thought.

[ 29 ]  John McDowell, 「Having the World in View: Sellars, Kant, and Intentionality,」 102– 103.

[ 30 ]  The problematic explananda here are the facts that [ 1 ]  space and time receive dialectical treatment in Hegel’s system at two very different locations: once early on in the Philosophy of Nature and once in the last third of the Philosophy of Subjective Spirit; and [ 2 ]  animals, who operate at the level of sensation and not thought, must nonetheless be able to track and in some sense represent space and time. The obvious answer seems to be that, as Hegel himself says, space and time are forms embodied in different substrata, one of which is non-conceptual.

这里尚不确定的待解释项是：[1] 空间和时间在黑格尔的体系中被在两个非常不同的位置受到了辩证的处理：较早的一处在《自然哲学》中，而另一处在主观精神哲学最后三分之一的部分；[2] 动物这一存在，尽管它只处在感觉层面，不能思考，但它还是得能追踪时间和空间，并且还要能够在某种意义上表征时空。这一显见的答案似乎就如黑格尔所说：时间和空间乃是体现在不同根基中的形式，其中之一是非概念性的。

[ 31 ]  This point is elaborated and defended more fully in Paul Redding, 「McDowell’s Radi calization of Kant’s Account of Concepts and Intuitions.」 

这一点被Paul Redding更充分地完善和捍卫了，见「McDowell’s Radicalization of Kant’s Account of Concepts and Intuitions.」 

[ 32 ]  Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Proposition 1.

[ 33 ]  McDowell, 「Having the World in View,」 143.

[ 34 ]  McDowell, 「Having the World in View,」 143.

[ 35 ]  This is a point made also by Roderick Firth in an article Sellars referred to often: 「Co herence, Certainty, and Epistemic Priority.」 

这也是Roderick Firth的观点。塞拉斯在这篇论文中经常引用他：「Coherence, Certainty, and Epistemic Priority.」 

[ 36 ]  Wilfrid Sellars, 「Inference and Meaning.」 Note the order of explication here: meaning is determined by inferential proprieties, not the other way around.

Wilfrid Sellars, 「Inference and Meaning.」 请注意这里的解释次序：意义是为推论性的性质决定的，不是被别的东西决定的。

[ 37 ]  Lewis Carroll, 「What the Tortoise said to Achilles.」[ 38 ]  Wilfrid Sellars, 「Some Remarks on Kant’s Theory of Experience.」 

[ 39 ]  There is a trivial sense of ‘relation’ in which any statement the surface grammar of which contains a relational [ that is, n-place for n > 1 ]  predicate describes a relation. But surface grammar is not decisive here. After all, sentences of the form 「X is related to Y」 are not all true for every substituend X and Y.

有种对「关系」的平凡定义是，在任意陈述中，包含关系谓词[ 比如说在n＞1中n的位置 ] 的表层语法都描述了一个关系。但表层语法在这里没有决定性的意义。毕竟，形如「X与Y相关」的句子对每一个代换项X与Y而言并不全为真。

[ 40 ]  Robert B. Brandom, 「Animating Ideas,」 27–110.

[ 41 ]  Brandom, 「Animating Ideas,」 32.[ 42 ]  Brandom, 「Animating Ideas,」 49.[ 43 ]  Brandom, 「Animating Ideas,」 62.

[ 44 ]  Brandom, 「Animating Ideas,」 66.

[ 45 ]  Brandom, 「Animating Ideas,」 70.

[ 46 ]  Brandom, 「Animating Ideas,」 88.

[ 47 ]  Cf. Sellars’s remark, 「[S] cientific terms have, as part of their logic a ‘line of retreat’ as well as a ‘plan of advance’,」 CDCM, 288. This is a point that, given Sellars’s treatment of meanings, applies to all terms, not just scientific terms.

参见塞拉斯的评论，「[S] cientific terms have, as part of their logic a ‘line of retreat’ as well as a ‘plan of advance’,」 CDCM, 288. 鉴于塞拉斯对意义的处理，这一点不仅只适用于科学术语，它同时适用于所有术语。

[ 48 ]  Brandom, 「Animating Ideas,」 100.

[ 49 ]  Brandom, 「Animating Ideas,」 102.

[ 50 ]  Brandom, 「Animating Ideas,」 97–98.

[ 51 ]  See the last of McDowell’s Woodbridge Lectures, 「Intentionality as a Relation,」 in Mc Dowell, Having the World in View, 44–65.

见麦克道威尔木桥镇讲座的末章, 「Intentionality as a Relation,」 in Mc Dowell, Having the World in View, 44–65.

[ 52 ]  I would like to thank Paul Redding, Carl Sachs, and Dean Moyar for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this chapter. Parts of this chapter have also been the target of feed back from audiences at Kent State University and the University of Sheffield. Thanks to them as well.

我要感谢Paul Redding，Carl Sachs和Dean Moyar对这一章初稿给出的有帮助性的意见。这章有几个部分也来自于肯特州立大学与谢菲尔德大学读者们的反馈，在此一并表示感谢。